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Resumen 
El propósito de este estudio es investigar empíricamente los determinantes macroeconómicos, 
estructurales y bancarios del crecimiento del crédito bancario tras la crisis financiera del 2008. 
Utilizando técnicas econométricas estándares de corte transversal en una muestra de alrededor de 80 
países, analizados en el período desde enero 2002 hasta mayo 2009, este estudio encuentra que una 
mayor expansión del crédito en los 24 meses anteriores a la crisis y un menor crecimiento del PIB 
de los socios comerciales después de esta están entre los determinantes más importantes de la caída 
del crédito bancario post-crisis. Variables estructurales como la profundidad e integración 
financieras también fueron determinantes importantes del crecimiento del crédito bancario post-
crisis. Finalmente, la política monetaria contracíclica y la liquidez jugaron un rol esencial que ayudó 
a reducir la contracción del crédito bancario después de la crisis financiera del 2008, sugiriendo que 
los países deben buscar marcos institucionales y de política apropiados que conduzcan a una 




The purpose of this paper is to empirically study the macroeconomic, structural and banking 
determinants of bank credit growth in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Using standard cross-
section econometric techniques on a sample covering over 80 countries, analyzed in the period from 
January 2002 to May 2009, this paper finds that larger bank credit booms in the 24 months before 
the crisis and lower GDP growth of main trading partners after are among the most relevant 
determinants of the post-crisis bank credit slowdown. Structural variables such as financial depth 
and integration were also important determinants of bank credit growth after the crisis. Finally, 
countercyclical monetary policy and liquidity played a critical role in alleviating bank credit 
contraction after the 2008 financial crisis, suggesting that countries should pursue appropriate 
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Rarely an episode of financial turmoil — at least in the post-World War II era — generated 
such economic havoc as the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis was unique in terms of the 
wealth destruction — estimated at US$ 50 trillion equivalent to one year of world GDP
1 — 
associated to the plunge in the value of stocks, bonds, property and other assets. Moreover, 
the crisis was unprecedented in its global scale and severity, hindering credit access to 
businesses, households and banks and choking economic activity.  
 
Banks, in particular, faced unparalleled liquidity stress hurting their ability to lend. Libor-
OIS spreads, a conventional measure of liquidity stress and confidence between banks, hit 
an all time high of 366 basis points (in US dollar rates) in October 2008, soon after Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. Libor-OIS spreads in other currencies showed 
similar inter-bank market strains (figure 1). The damage on global bank balance sheets in 
advanced countries — with losses projected by the IMF reaching over US$ 4 trillion in the 
period 2009-2010
2 — provoked a strong credit slowdown. Bank credit decelerated 
significantly in several regions, with Emerging Europe presenting the lowest average 
growth rate in the period post-crisis. Bank credit in OECD countries also slowed down 
especially in countries where banks received public support in the form of capital injections 
(figure 2).  Displaying high synchronicity, bank credit contracted in 95% of all countries at 
least in one of the eight months after September 2008 (table 1). This credit crunch is still 
ongoing and may persist for some time despite nascent recovery in several countries. In 
others, bank credit may not grow for quite a while at the same rates it used to before 
September 2008. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the evolution of bank credit throughout the 2008 
financial crisis using a dataset covering over 80 countries. In this context, this paper aims to 
provide answers to four relevant questions of interest to the profession: (i) which countries 
were able to maintain healthy
3 bank credit growth despite the crisis?; (ii) which were the 
                                                 
1 The estimates of wealth destruction are from Loser (2009). Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) assert that the 
current financial crisis is, beyond contention, extremely severe by any metric. 
2 Estimates presented in the May 2009 issue of the Global Financial Stability Report, IMF (2009). 
3 Bank credit growth could be inefficient if misdirected to unfit sectors of the economy and, therefore, credit 
quality (health) could be jeopardized. This paper does not focus on credit quality, limiting itself to the study 
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banking systems to maintain credit flows to the economy?; (iii) to what extent is this 
performance dependent on what happened to bank credit growth during the period previous 
to the crisis?
4; and (iv) has monetary policy played a role in attenuating the severity of the 
slump in credit? Answers to these questions will help assess the quality of the banking 
system, comparing its performance among countries in its utmost important task of granting 
loans to businesses and households
5, an essential element in the process of economic 
growth.  
 
The choice of bank credit growth as measure of bank performance
6 is justified by a large 
literature emphasizing the role credit plays on the process of economic growth.
7 Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), for example, show that external financing dependent industries in the 
United States expanded faster than less dependent industries. A clear-cut general 
interpretation of this finding is that countries with more developed financial systems 
(including more banking) could grow more than countries with less developed systems. 
Similarly, Levine and Zervos (1998) use data on 47 countries to show that bank lending has 
a strong independent effect on growth. Surprisingly, while the literature is ample on papers 
investigating the effects of financial development on economic growth, articles researching 
the determinants of credit growth are less abundant.
8 Thus, by focusing on the determinants 
                                                                                                                                                     
of credit growth determinants. Thus, whenever the paper refers to credit performance, the reference is valid 
for measures of credit flows growth rather than credit quality improvements. 
4 Schularik and Taylor (2009) show that credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial crises in the history 
of 12 developed countries, suggesting that crises are “credit booms gone wrong”. 
5 One could classify banking functions into four main categories in line with contemporary banking theory 
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008): (i) offering liquidity and payment services; (ii) transforming assets; (iii) 
managing risks; and (iv) processing information and monitoring borrowers. Clearly, these tasks are all related 
in one way or another to the general role of financial intermediation, which in simple terms mean taking 
deposits from the public and allocating them as loans (credits) to different users. 
6 In principle, one could use other indicators to measure bank performance based on bank profitability or the 
evolution of bank stock market prices (a market-based view). Our choice of performance based on bank credit 
relies on the fact that credit allocation is perhaps one of the most welfare-enhancing activities with a well-
documented relationship with economic growth. 
7 Bernanke et al. (1995) is a classical example in the family of financial accelerator models where banks can 
amplify shocks (monetary and others) to the economy through the credit channel. Thus, banks behavior is of 
particular relevance during crisis, where their action can severely amplify shocks hurting economic activity. 
8 The exception being several articles estimating vector autoregressive models that include credit (e.g. 
Hofmann, 2001). But they do not focus on econometric identification and cannot address questions raised in 
our study. 
  2of bank credit growth, this paper clearly contributes to the existing literature. Moreover, 
this contribution is especially relevant and timely in the context of the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
The findings of the paper are remarkably robust and consistent with the basic intuition 
regarding the drivers of bank credit growth. Estimates of standard cross-section 
econometric techniques on a dataset covering 83 advanced, emerging and developing 
economies find that countries with (i) high bank credit growth prior to the crisis, (ii) 
suffering stronger demand contraction after the Lehman Bros. shock, (iii) with high 
financial integration with respect to the rest of the world, and (iv) with weaker 
countercyclical monetary policy response, presented, on average, lower growth rates of 
bank credit in the period after the Lehman Bros. collapse. This last result is of special 
importance from a policy perspective and constitutes a major contribution of this paper. It 
suggests that countries can be better off developing a macroeconomic and institutional 
framework enabling them to display a counter-cyclical monetary policy to attenuate credit 
contraction when times turn rough. 
 
The paper continues as follows: section 2 describes the data and the econometric 
methodology, section 3 presents estimation results including some robustness exercises, 
and section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data and Empirical Model  
 
The dataset is composed of monthly, quarterly and annual data on macroeconomic, 
structural and banking variables within the period from January 2002 to May 2009. 
Although we collected data for 116 countries, missing values for several variables reduce 
the number of countries in our estimations to 83. The sources of the macroeconomic data 
are: the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Direction of Trade Statistics 
(DOTS); the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI); and the United Nation’s 
International Merchandise Trade Statistics (IMTS). Structural data was collected from the 
IMF’s IFS; World Bank (WB); Chinn and Ito (2006); and Calvo et al. (2008). Banking data 
sources are: the Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) of the IMF’s Global Financial 
Stability Report; A New Database on Financial Development and Structure from Beck et 
al. (2000); Raddatz (2009); and Micco et al. (2004). 
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growth post Lehman Bros. bankruptcy (the dependent variable), we estimated cross-country 
models, controlling for the growth rate of bank credit in the two years previous to the crisis 
and for the macroeconomic demand shock after the crisis. The dependent variable is the 
deviation from trend of the monthly growth rate of real bank credit in the post-Lehman 
bankruptcy period (average of oct.08 – may.09), which we consider to be an accurate 
measure of bank performance of different countries during the 2008 financial crisis. To 
construct this variable we used nominal bank credit series from the IFS (line 22d), and the 
CPI inflation (IFS line 64), which we used as deflator for the levels. The real credit series 
were seasonally adjusted, and then, we estimated the trend of these series using Hodrick-
Prescott filters with monthly data from January 2002 until May 2009. Finally, the month 
over month growth rates were calculated, both for the deflated series and for the trends, 
which were then subtracted to obtain the finally used deviation from trend variable.   
 
The decision to calculate the dependent variable with monthly instead of quarterly data is 
partially due to data availability. The post-Lehman Bros. bankruptcy period is only about a 
year long, and therefore only a few quarters could be used (depending on the data 
availability in the IFS). Hence, using monthly data allowed having at least eight 
observations for each country of the sample. 
 
The initial aim was to have a sample of countries as large as possible, so we consider all 
countries for whom the nominal credit and CPI inflation series were available (line 22d and 
line 64 of the IFS, respectively) for at least May 2009, excluding sample outliers with 
average real bank credit growth falling outside a 95% confidence interval. Therefore, we 
have 83 country observations for the dependent variable, and an ample range of country 
observations for the independent variables. 
 
We hypothesize that growth in real bank credit post Lehman Bros. bankruptcy depends on 
the following explanatory variables: 
 
•  Real credit growth (sep.06-aug.08) (IFS) is a variable that controls for the credit boom 
in the two years previous to September 2008, month in which Lehman Bros. bankruptcy 
took place. The decision to take the two years before the crisis, instead of, for example, 
  4one or five years, is discussed in detail later in the paper. In line with the credit boom 
and bust cycles literature (for example, Tornell and Westermann, 2002) we expect this 
variable to have a negative coefficient. 
 
•  A set of variables accounting for economic performance, external shocks and policy 
stance after the Lehman Bros. collapse: 
 
o  Real GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 (IFS). 
A positive coefficient is expected, as stronger economic activity should lead to 
higher bank credit; 
 
o  Trading partners’ GDP growth (average between the fourth quarter of 2008 
and first quarter of 2009) (IFS and DOTS). Averages for each country are 
weighted by the participation of all other countries in its total exports in 2007. 
Higher growth of a country’s trading partners suggests more demand for that 
country’s exports and, therefore, stronger economic activity, leading to more 
bank credit. Thus, we expected a positive coefficient; 
 
o  % Change in Terms of Trade in the fourth quarter of 2008 (IMTS). A more 
favorable evolution of the terms of trade positively affects GDP growth, and 
hence bank credit (positive coefficient expected); 
 
o  % Change in money market rate between September 2008 and May 2009 (IFS). 
The evolution of the money market rate depends on liquidity conditions of the 
economy and the monetary policy rate. A larger reduction in the monetary 
policy rate would lower the money market rate, favoring credit expansion 
(negative coefficient expected); 
 
o  Exchange rate regime (Calderon and Smith-Hebbel, 2008). This variable takes 
the value of 1 if the exchange rate regime is floating, 3 if fixed, and 2 if it is an 
intermediate regime. A negative coefficient is expected, as floating regimes 
insulate countries from the external shock as it allows the exchange rate to 
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policy;  
 
•  A set of structural variables that reflect characteristics of the countries that may affect 
the development of local credit: 
 
o  Credit over GDP in 2007 (IFS). A positive coefficient is expected, as deeper 
financial markets would facilitate credit expansion, for example, through 
offering financing at lower rates (Rajan and Zingales, 1998); 
 
o  Nominal GDP level and GDP per capita in 2007 (IFS). Being a richer economy 
should make credit more available for several reasons; hence, we expect a 
positive coefficient;  
 
o  Real GDP growth in 2007 (IFS). Countries that experienced lower growth in the 
year previous to the crisis, should have a smaller credit boom prior to the crisis 
and potentially smaller credit contraction in its aftermath (negative coefficient 
expected); 
 
o  International financial integration in 2007 (Index of Chinn and Ito, 2006). 
Higher financial integration facilitates a country’s financing, but it also makes it 
more vulnerable to international shocks. Thus, in the context of a crisis a 
negative coefficient is expected; 
 
o  Trade openness in 2007 (WB). Measured by exports plus imports over GDP. 
Higher trade openness may contribute to banks credit, but in the event of a 
global credit crisis, more open countries may suffer more from trade credit 
contraction resulting from international liquidity constraints (a negative 
coefficient is expected);        
 
o  External debt in 2007 (% of GDP, IMF and WB). A negative coefficient is 
expected, as higher international liabilities could be seen as higher risk, and 
hence limiting access to new funding; 
 
  6o  Current account balance in 2007 (% of GDP, IFS). A higher current account 
deficit could signal a country’s vulnerability, raising risks and limiting the 
ability of a country’s banking system to receive new loans, so the expected 
coefficient’s sign is positive; 
  
o  Domestic liabilities dollarization in 2004 (Calvo et al., 2008). A higher share of 
liabilities in foreign currency makes a country more exposed to currency 
mismatches which could affect bank credit if exchange rate varies; hence we 
expect a negative coefficient (Calvo et al., 2008);  
 
•  A set of variables that account for the characteristics of the countries’ banking systems 
that could affect the evolution of domestic bank credit: 
 
o  Share of public ownership of the banking system in 2002 (Micco et al., 2004). 
We expect a positive relationship with the dependent variable as public banks 
behave more counter-cyclically, responding less to external shocks than private 
banks, positively affecting total bank credit (Micco et al., 2004); 
 
o  Share of foreign ownership of the banking system in 2002 (Micco et al., 2004). 
Rojas-Suárez and Wiesbrod (1996) find that a higher presence of foreign banks 
brings more stability to total bank credit (positive coefficient expected); 
 
o  Bank leverage in 2007 (FSI). Higher leverage may signal risks turning banks 
more vulnerable in the event of a crisis. Therefore, we expect a negative 
coefficient; 
 
o  Bank return on equity and bank return on assets in 2007 (FSI). A bank with 
sound profitability will most likely have great access to financing (+), but it 
could also indicate that banks have taken riskier positions (-) (the sign of this 
coefficient is an empirical question); 
 
o  Bank concentration in 2007 (Beck et al., 2000). Concentration is defined as total 
assets of the three largest banks as a percentage of total assets of the banking 
system. A more concentrated banking system could signal a strong market 
  7position and higher profits increasing its resilience against external shocks; 
hence, we expect a positive sign for the coefficient; 
 
o  Banks’ dependence on wholesale funding prior to the crisis (Raddatz, 2009). A 
negative coefficient is expected, as higher dependence on wholesale funding 
reflects more vulnerability, as this sort of financing is more volatile than retail 
funding; 
 
o  Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets in 2007 (FSI). Having a higher 
capital buffer to absorb losses in the context of a crisis helps banks to expand 
credit (positive coefficient expected); 
 
o  Bank nonperforming loans to total loans in 2007 (FSI). A negative coefficient is 
expected, as banking systems with higher shares of nonperforming loans are 
riskier.    
 
o  Bank provisions to nonperforming loans in 2007 (FSI). No clear expectation for 
the coefficient’s sign as lower provision could reflect better assets (+), but with 
the risk of an unrealistically optimistic evaluation of banks’ portfolio that could 
catch banks unguarded in the face of higher than expected losses (-). 
   
•  A set of dummy variables accounting for effects of the following groups of countries: 
OECD members, EMBI countries (a proxy of emerging economies), developing 
countries, Latin America, Emerging Europe and Emerging Asia. 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the above-described dependent and 
independent variables.  
 
The reduced form empirical model for the credit market can be summarized as follows: 
 
1) Credit supply equation:   
  ) ( X f Y
s =
 
  where matrix X contains lending spreads (lending rates minus money market rates), 
structural variables, among others. 
  82) Credit demand equation: 
                         
) (Z g Y
d =  
 
where matrix Z contains lending spreads, structural variables, among others. 
 
3) In equilibrium:  
 
      = Y Y →
d s ) (
* Ω = h Y
 
where Y
* is our dependent variable used in the econometric estimation, while matrix Ω                             
contains all independent variables mentioned above. 
 
Therefore, we estimate the above reduced form model by OLS which can be represented by 
the following equation: 
 
1 1 n1 Y n k nk e   = Ω ×β +
 
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
The first objective of our empirical analysis is to identify the main macroeconomic, 
banking and structural determinants of bank credit growth in the period after the Lehmann 
Bros. collapse. Then, we conduct a series of exercises using dummy interactions to identify 
the differential impact of these determinants among regional groups of countries. We also 
use dummy variables to show that some of the determinants that, on average, seem not to 
be relevant to explain bank credit growth in the aftermath of the crisis, become important 
for countries displaying extreme values of such determinants. Finally, we perform a 
sensitivity analysis that checks whether or not the main results hold for different time 
windows for the credit boom prior to the crisis and for different de-trending definitions of 
bank credit. We also show that the quantitative effect of the credit boom previous to the 
crisis is much larger than in other episodes (sub-prime crisis) and normal times. 
 
a)  Main determinants of credit growth after crisis 
 
The estimation results of the model described in the previous section are shown in Table 3. 
The dependent variable is the deviation from trend of the monthly average seasonally-
  9adjusted real bank credit growth post Lehman Bros. bankruptcy. The independent variables 
are those included in the   matrix discussed in the previous section. The main determinant 
of credit growth post-crisis is credit growth prior to the crisis. In column 1, a simple 
regression taking the boom in credit 24 months prior to the crisis as the single independent 
variable can explain 45 percent — as measured by the R-squared of the regression — of the 
evolution of bank credit after the crisis. This evidence strongly supports the existence of 
lending booms and busts, a stylized fact typical of several financial crisis episodes as 
suggested by Tornell and Westerman (2002). Moreover, this effect is strikingly robust 
among different specifications and is of quantitative relevance. In particular, an extra 
monthly increase of credit growth above the trend of one percentage point in the 24 months 
prior to the crisis leads to a reduction of around two percentage points relative to trend in 
the growth rate of credit after the crisis.  
Ω
 
Another important determinant of credit growth after the crisis is the size of the external 
shock affecting demand across countries, which is included in three different forms in 
Table 3. Column 2 uses the deviation from trend growth rate of real GDP, column 3 
represents the shock through the growth rate of countries’ terms of trade and column 4 uses 
growth of trading partners. In all measures, the coefficients are statistically significant and 
have the expected positive signs. Countries with higher real GDP growth after the crisis 
presented higher growth of real bank credit. But among the three measures, the real GDP 
growth of trading partners is the most suitable, since it has the highest coverage of 
countries. Moreover, real growth of trading partners is exogenous compared to other 
measures such as real GDP growth, which are clearly affected by real credit growth, our 
dependent variable. The coefficient of real GDP growth of trading partners is quantitatively 
important. A one percentage point increase in main trading partners’ GDP raises real bank 
credit growth by a monthly 0.1 percentage point above trend for the period after the crisis. 
 
With equation in column 4 as our first benchmark, we turned to columns 5 to 9 where 
structural and banking variables are included as determinants of bank credit growth. They 
all come out with the expected signs but are mostly not statistically significant, possibly 
due to high collinearity among variables. Bank concentration is the sole exception. 
Countries with a more concentrated banking industry displayed higher growth rates of bank 
  10credit, confirming our intuition and suggesting that the banking sector in these countries 
may have been more profitable (nonetheless, measures such as return on equity are not 
statistically significant at standard significance levels).
9  
 
In columns 10 to 12 we considered the role played by monetary policy and liquidity effects 
on bank credit growth after the crisis using two measure of monetary policy. In columns 10 
and 11, we used the percentage change in the money market rate in the period after the 
crisis as an independent variable
10. The coefficient is highly statistically significant and has 
the expected negative sign. Countries where the money market rate dropped the most after 
the crisis presented higher growth rates of bank credit. This is an important result since it 
shows that those countries which recovered more quickly from the liquidity freeze in the 
inter-bank market (money market) could extend more credit to the economy. This also has 
a strong policy content as it suggests that real bank credit grew more in countries where 
countercyclical monetary policy was more aggressive, assuming that the transmission 
mechanism was operating properly helping reduce money market rates.
11  
 
One problem of the estimation in column 10 is that the change in money market rate is 
endogenous. For example, policy rates may have been strongly reduced reacting to the bank 
credit crunch in several countries. In column 11, therefore, we instrument money market 
rates with average inflation in the last three months prior to the crisis. Results are 
encouraging as the marginal effect increased indicating a stronger effect of monetary policy 
(and liquidity) on bank credit growth
12. In particular, a 10 percentage point reduction in the 
                                                 
9 Several additional variables were considered in the regressions but were left out of table 3 because they were 
not statistically significant. These variables are: Nominal GDP level, GDP per capita, Real GDP growth in 
2007, Trade openness, External debt, Current account balance, Bank domestic liabilities dollarization, Share 
of public ownership of the banking system, Share of foreign ownership of the banking system, Bank 
dependence on wholesale funding, Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, Bank nonperforming loans 
to total loans, Bank provisions to nonperforming loans, and Bank return on assets. Results are available upon 
request. 
10 This measure helps us normalize the absolute change in the money market rate (in basis points) by the level 
of the money market rate in September 2008. 
11 To better assess the extent which countercyclical monetary policy played a role, data on the policy rates 
used by central banks is needed. Unfortunately, this is not readily available. We use money market rates as 
proxy for central bank policy rates, a reasonable assumption during normal times. This is hardly so in 
turbulent times. 
12 The increase in the size of the coefficient of the money market rate in the regression of column 11 
(instrumented) compared to 10 (not instrumented) is associated with the endogeneity bias. This bias is 
positive, attenuating the negative causal effect of money market rates on credit growth, as the reaction of 
  11rate of growth of money market rate post-crisis increased the average monthly growth rate 
of bank credit by 0.04 percentage points. This result is quantitatively significant. Taking the 
case of Chile, one of the highest drops of money market rates since September 2008 (76 
percent through May 2009), this reduction, ceteris paribus, contributed to an increase in 
bank credit of around 0.3 percent per month on average above trend in the period after the 
crisis. Table 4 shows results for a 2SLS regression. Focusing on the first stage, we conclude 
that inflation is a good instrument to change in money market rates as they are both 
strongly related. Therefore, there are grounds to believe that the marginal effect estimated 
in column 11 is a reliable representation of the true effect of money market rates on bank 
credit growth post-crisis. 
 
In a similar spirit, column 12 examines quantitatively the relationship between monetary 
policy and bank credit growth using a different specification. This combines the absolute 
change in the money market rate (in basis points) with a dummy variable receiving a value 
of 1 for countries with a money market rate below 10% in September 2008. The coefficient 
associated to the product of the change in money market rate and the dummy variable is 
negative and statistically significant. This suggests that the reduction in the money market 
rate is relevant only for those countries in the sample.
13 
 
In column 13 and 14, we test if the exchange rate regime existing previous to the crisis 
affected bank credit. Results confirm our intuition that floating regimes attenuate credit 
slowed down as they allowed for a more independent countercyclical monetary policy.
14 
Finally, specifications 14 to 17 control for cross regional differences affecting the intercept 
of the regressions. Results of column 14 show that being an EMBI country, unconditionally 
lowered credit growth by 0.35 percentage points relative to trend. Nevertheless, column 17 
                                                                                                                                                     
monetary policy to the credit slowdown was not accounted for in the non-instrumented regression in column 
10. 
13 The coefficient on the non-interacted variable is unexpectedly positive, but weakly statistically significant. 
One possibility is that, since the dummy variable cover 85% of the sample, the non-interacted variable 
(absolute change of money market rate) is capturing other non-observables affecting credit markets in these 
economies. A Wald test rejects the null hypothesis under 1% significance level that the marginal effects of the 
interacted and non-interacted money market rates are equal.  
14 It is worth noting that the coefficient associated to the regression of column 13 is not statistically 
significant, albeit having the correct sign. This provides partial evidence of the correlation between the 
exchange rate regime and monetary policy. 
  12shows that the only region with a positive and statically significant effect is Emerging Asia. 
Quantitatively, bank credit growth was unconditionally higher in this region by around 0.5 
percentage points monthly above trend on average. Finally, columns 15 to 16 do not show a 
statistically significant difference between those OECD countries receiving or not public 
capital assistance. However, bank credit growth was more negatively affected in OECD 
countries where banks did receive public capital support (negative coefficient in column 
16). In Table 4, we explore in more detail cross-regional differences in the effect of several 
variables on bank credit growth post-crisis.  
 
b) Results using dummy interactions for regions and other variables 
 
Table 5 conducts a series of exercises analyzing cross-regional differences in effects of 
variables on bank credit growth, our dependent variable. All regressions in Table 5, control 
for bank credit growth prior to the crisis and trading partner' GDP growth. Results for 
columns 1 and 2 indicate that the effect of bank credit boom prior to the crisis on credit 
growth after the crisis is stronger for OECD countries than in emerging or developing 
countries (the effect is twice as high as the average effect shown for a typical specification 
in Table 3). Among all emerging regions, Asia had the strongest marginal effect for the 
credit boom prior to the crisis. These are regions less likely to have the largest credit booms 
prior to the crisis, so the size of the marginal coefficients explaining any credit bust in 
OECD and Emerging Asia need to be larger than in other regions of the world for a bust of 
similar magnitude after the crisis. In columns 3 and 4 we examine if the external shock 
affected credit differently across regions. Our results show that Emerging Asia is the region 
that suffered the most, possibly reflecting the stronger deceleration in GDP growth of its 
partners located in other regions of the world where the crisis was more severe. Column 5 
shows differences across regions of the effect of monetary policy on credit growth. Money 
market rates seem important in OECD countries reflecting both major drops in liquidity 
premiums after the crisis as well as aggressive countercyclical monetary policies in member 
countries.  
 
Table 6 presents results of several regression specifications that include interaction terms. 
In column 1, we examine if the credit boom before the crisis has a nonlinear effect on credit 
growth after the crisis. To accomplish that, we use an interaction term equal to the product 
  13between the variable credit boom and a dummy variable that receives 1 if the credit boom 
prior to the crisis is above the 75
th percentile of the distribution of credit booms, and zero 
otherwise. Results suggest that the effect of the credit boom prior to the crisis is similar for 
countries having high or low credit booms. Similarly, we examine nonlinear effects in 
growth of main trading partners. The evidence does not show significant differences of 
effect among high and low levels for this variable. Using the same methodology in columns 
3 to 7, we examine five additional variables where effects may be different depending 
where the country is located on the statistical distribution of the specific variable. Two 
results are worth mentioning. Firstly, financial depth seems to contribute to credit growth, 
but countries with low financial depth (using credit/GDP as proxy) were marginally better 
off compared to countries with high financial depth, against our initial intuition.
15 
Secondly, and more importantly, countries with low financial integration have performed 
better in terms of bank credit growth than those highly integrated. This is an important 
result as it suggests that in a financial crisis episode of global proportions, being less 
financially integrated insulates the banking system in particular, and the economy as a 
whole, from external financing disruptions.     
 
c) Sensitivity analysis 
 
Table 7 presents results for three different sensitivity tests to check for the robustness of our 
results. All regressions in the table present results controlling for growth of trading 
partners’ GDP. In columns 1 to 5, we define credit booms for four different time windows 
for credit growth prior to the crisis, contrasting with the window of 24 months used in 
Tables 3 to 6. Results are statistically significant for all definitions. Interestingly, the size of 
the marginal effect of the boom prior to the crisis is increasing with the timeframe defined 
for the boom. This may reflect the fact that booms of longer periods are consistent with 
higher larger credit reversals. This result is in line with those highlighted in the literature of 
crisis prevention. According to Biggs et al. (2009) five-year lending booms are good 
predictors of financial distress. Results in column 2, which use our main definition of boom 
                                                 
15 The marginal effect is 0.32 compared to 0.20. This is very small difference given the standard errors of 
these parameters. 
  14(24 months), show the highest R-squared among all measures, an extra reason for the 
selection of this time window for our baseline regressions.  
 
Column 6 changes the definition of trend for the calculation of the dependent and 
independent variables maintaining the window of 24 months. Instead of using the last data 
point (May 2009), we excluded the months after the crisis in the trend calculation, 
assuming simply that the trend would continue its evolution as there was no crisis. It is 
worth noting that this is a very conservative assumption as the crisis may or may not be 
viewed as a structural break in the country series looking forward. The effect of the credit 
boom is still statistically significant, at 10 percent significance level, albeit of smaller size.  
 
Finally, columns 7 and 8 show results for credit booms taken for different periods using the 
same dataset. In column 7, we use the sub-prime crisis episode and in column 8, a small 
correction in 2006. In both cases, for consistency, we maintained the window of 24 months 
for bank credit growth before the crisis and the eight month average period (since Lehmann 
Bros. collapse) that we apply in our exercises. In both cases, the effects are still statistically 
significant, but the size of the coefficients are less than half of those presented in Table 3. 
This shows that the credit booms before the 2008 financial crisis is of much large 
importance in explaining the bust thereafter than in other periods, giving preeminence to 




The main purpose of this paper was to identify the main determinants of bank credit growth 
after the 2008 financial crisis. Using a dataset covering about 80 countries for the period 
January 2002 to May 2009, and applying standard cross section econometric techniques, we 
found that credit booms prior to the crisis is an important determinant of credit contraction 
observed in the aftermath of the crisis. This result is in line with the literature of lending 
booms and busts cycles as in Tornell and Westerman (2002) among others. We also found 
that the external shock affected countries differently depending on the growth performance 
of their main trading partners. Additionally, we found that bank credit responded very 
differently among world regions, which can be partially explained by the diversity in 
  15countries’ structural characteristics including, for example, financial depth and international 
financial integration. Finally, the role of countercyclical monetary policy and liquidity was 
extremely important, alleviating the credit crunch in the period after the crisis. 
 
Our main contribution to the literature is to document the behavior of banks in their most 
essential task as financial intermediaries, namely extend credit. This paper is timely as the 
world recovers from the major post-world war II financial turmoil. We believe that this is a 
contribution of high policy content to all countries. Developing nations were benefited from 
their low financial integration in the context of this global crisis, but this does not 
necessarily mean that they should avoid pursuing financial integration with the rest of the 
world. To be sure, navigating in a volatile financial world demands an institutional 
framework conducive to counter-cyclical monetary policies. The results in this paper 
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OECD (1) with banks not receiving public capital support: Spain, Finland, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, Poland, Portugal and Czech Republic. 
OECD (2) with public capital support: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. Emerging Asia: Indonesia, Kazakhstan and Thailand. Emerging Europe: Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. Latin America: Argentina, Brasil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,  Peru, Dominican 
Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFS data. 
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Growth of real bank credit to domestic private sector, per country (1) (2) (3)








post-LB       
(6) Aug.08 Sep.08 Oct.08 Nov.08 Dec.08 Jan.09 Feb.09 Mar.09 Apr.09 May.09
Angola 3.7 3.6 2.9 1.8 3.3 3.4 3.5 5.2 3.2 -2.8 2.9 4.8 3.0
Argentina 1.7 1.6 0.6 0.7 1.4 1.6 -0.6 0.3 0.1 1.7 1.0 0.5 0.2
Armenia 2.8 4.0 0.6 2.5 2.7 3.1 0.2 2.2 2.0 1.0 2.8 -5.2 -1.3
Austria 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.8 1.0 -0.2 2.6 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1
Bahamas 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.9 -0.2 0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.4
Belgium 1.1 0.6 0.3 1.9 -0.8 1.1 0.1 -1.2 0.0 -0.3 0.1 -1.3 4.1
Botswana 0.6 1.3 0.6 1.2 5.0 0.5 -1.4 1.1 5.2 -1.1 -1.6 2.8 -0.6
Brazil 1.7 1.8 0.6 1.9 3.2 2.3 2.4 1.0 -1.5 0.4 -1.5 1.3 0.1
Bulgaria (7) 2.0 2.2 0.4 2.6 1.3 1.1 1.1 -0.3 1.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
Burundi 0.1 0.0 1.5 -1.8 0.8 1.5 -0.2 -0.8 0.2 2.0 4.5 2.2 2.3
Cambodia 2.4 3.4 0.9 2.9 1.9 2.4 4.2 0.9 2.0 -1.4 -0.7 0.0 0.2
Cape Verde 0.7 1.6 1.4 2.9 1.8 -0.5 1.2 1.5 0.6 1.4 2.7 3.3 1.1
Chile 1.0 0.7 0.4 -1.0 2.2 3.4 -0.4 2.5 -0.6 -1.1 -0.6 0.8 -0.8
China; Hong Kong 0.4 0.5 -0.7 2.8 -5.1 -1.4 -4.0 1.8 -0.6 -3.3 -5.7 9.9 -2.4
China; Macao 1.2 2.5 0.1 1.4 3.6 1.4 -1.9 0.2 -0.6 2.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.9
Colombia 1.5 1.3 -0.1 -0.6 3.3 0.3 -0.4 -0.8 1.8 0.2 -0.3 0.7 -2.6
Costa Rica 1.4 1.5 0.9 -0.6 -0.1 0.1 -1.9 6.0 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.3
Croatia 1.5 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.6 1.9 0.4 1.7 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7
Czech Republic (7) 1.5 1.2 0.4 1.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.6 -0.4 0.2 -0.1
Denmark (7) 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.3 -0.8 -0.2 0.0 -0.7
Dominican Republic 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.3 -0.2 0.9 3.1 1.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.7 0.7
Ecuador 1.2 0.8 -0.3 2.2 1.4 1.9 1.6 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -2.7 -1.6 -1.1
Egypt 0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.9 1.3 1.5 -0.6 0.3 0.5 -0.8 -1.3 -1.0 -2.9
El Salvador 0.5 0.0 -0.6 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 -1.4 -0.1 -0.8 -1.2 -0.5 -0.8
Estonia (7) 2.4 0.4 0.0 0.5 -0.8 -1.0 0.3 -0.6 1.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.5
Fiji 1.2 -0.1 0.8 -0.2 0.7 1.4 2.6 0.1 -1.2 3.6 0.6 0.3 -0.7
Finland 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.1
France 0.7 0.4 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 1.0 1.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2
Georgia 3.8 2.3 0.4 -6.8 -1.3 0.9 9.2 2.1 0.8 0.6 -3.3 -3.6 -3.1
Germany -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.3 1.6 -0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.0
Greece 1.2 0.7 -0.4 1.6 0.1 2.1 0.0 -1.8 0.7 -1.7 -0.9 0.4 -2.3
Guatemala 0.6 -0.2 0.5 0.1 1.0 -0.1 2.0 0.9 -0.6 0.3 1.2 0.3 0.0
Haiti -0.3 0.9 0.6 2.2 -2.7 -1.3 0.7 1.3 -3.6 4.1 0.2 1.4 2.1
Honduras 1.6 0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.3 -1.3 0.0 -0.1 0.4 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 0.1
Hungary (7) 1.7 0.8 1.3 1.6 0.2 12.4 -3.7 2.2 5.7 -0.5 1.0 -4.1 -2.4
Indonesia 0.4 1.5 0.7 2.0 1.0 4.7 2.8 -3.0 2.3 0.7 -0.9 -0.6 0.0
Ireland 1.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 -0.2 0.2 0.6 -0.5 4.8 1.2 -0.8 0.5 0.0
Italy 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.1 -0.9 1.2 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0
Japan 0.2 -0.2 0.4 -0.3 -0.6 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.3 1.0
Jordan 1.3 0.0 0.5 -0.2 0.1 1.2 0.2 2.6 1.7 0.0 -0.3 -0.7 -1.1
Kazakhstan 4.5 -0.6 1.4 -1.2 0.6 0.1 2.1 -0.1 1.7 10.4 -0.6 -1.3 -1.4
Kenya -0.1 0.3 -0.5 0.3 -1.2 1.3 -2.2 -1.1 0.3 -1.8 -2.1 -12.7 14.1
Latvia (7) 3.2 0.3 -0.1 0.6 0.7 0.2 3.9 0.6 -0.6 -1.9 -3.2 0.8 -0.4
Lithuania (7) 3.1 1.4 -0.7 1.0 1.0 -0.2 1.2 -1.7 -1.9 -0.7 -1.3 -0.2 -0.5
Luxembourg 1.9 2.9 -1.9 6.6 0.8 1.0 -2.6 -9.6 -3.3 0.9 -4.9 3.6 -0.1
Macedonia 1.9 2.3 0.9 1.7 2.5 2.0 1.7 0.9 2.4 1.1 0.0 0.1 -0.6
Mauritius 0.4 1.0 0.9 -1.2 3.3 5.0 -0.3 3.1 -1.9 1.2 1.1 0.2 -0.9
Mexico 1.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.8 -1.9 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.9 -0.3 -1.1 -0.6 -1.3
Moldova 2.0 1.9 -0.4 -0.3 2.2 -4.4 1.0 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.5 0.1 -1.7
Mongolia 3.1 1.4 -0.7 -1.2 1.6 1.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.8 2.0 -4.7 -3.5 -1.2
Morocco 0.9 1.8 1.1 2.8 2.5 2.0 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.6
Mozambique 1.2 2.0 3.5 -1.1 4.9 5.4 1.7 7.2 4.0 1.9 5.0 -0.4 3.1
Netherlands 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 1.1 0.5 -2.4 0.6 0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.1
Netherlands Antilles 1.2 0.3 0.9 0.7 -0.4 0.9 1.2 0.6 2.4 2.0 0.6 0.1 -0.1
Nicaragua 1.6 0.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.2 -0.9 -0.9 -0.3 0.4 -1.0 0.0
Nigeria 2.1 4.8 0.0 1.5 0.9 1.0 0.4 1.4 2.9 -3.0 -1.2 -0.4 -1.0
Panama 0.9 0.7 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.5 -0.1 0.0
Paraguay 0.9 2.0 1.7 2.1 4.0 4.4 0.5 1.4 1.5 2.1 0.9 2.9 -0.3
Peru 1.1 1.7 1.1 3.5 1.7 5.3 0.8 2.6 2.4 1.1 -1.2 -3.5 1.3
Poland (7) 1.5 1.8 1.6 2.9 2.6 4.2 1.0 5.3 2.3 1.9 -0.3 -2.0 0.7
Portugal 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.9 -0.1 0.9 1.8 -0.3 1.4 -0.1 0.6 0.3 0.4
Romania 3.1 3.2 0.2 2.1 4.0 -1.2 0.9 2.3 3.8 1.3 -3.4 -1.2 -0.9
Russia 2.7 1.9 0.2 1.9 0.8 1.0 0.4 -0.1 6.2 -0.6 -2.7 -0.6 -1.9
Samoa 1.3 -0.8 0.3 0.1 -3.3 2.8 -0.9 0.1 2.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -1.1
Saudi Arabia 1.1 1.5 -0.2 0.4 1.2 0.6 1.1 -0.7 0.4 0.0 -0.7 -0.7 -1.7
Serbia 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.9 2.9 5.5 1.7 2.1 1.6 -0.6 1.5 0.5 -1.3
Seychelles 0.9 -0.2 -0.2 -3.3 2.7 2.2 -10.6 12.0 -0.1 -0.2 2.3 -3.2 -4.2
Singapore 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.0 1.4 -1.0
South Africa 1.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.6 -0.3 0.3 1.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.6
Spain 1.4 0.5 1.4 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.8 7.9 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.4
Sudan 2.7 -0.1 0.0 1.8 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.1 0.8 -0.4 -0.8 -0.3 -0.6
Sweden (7) 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.3 1.1 0.6 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.0
Switzerland 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.6 -0.2 0.3 0.0 1.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.5 0.4
Tanzania 2.0 0.8 2.6 7.1 -9.7 8.7 7.9 2.2 -1.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.3
Thailand 0.1 0.2 0.5 3.6 0.6 1.6 0.8 1.1 0.8 -1.4 -0.5 0.5 1.0
Trinidad and Tobago 1.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -1.7 0.1 0.4 -1.8 0.6 1.9 -2.6 -1.1 0.4
Tunisia 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.2 1.5 1.5 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.6 -0.2
Turkey 1.8 1.7 -0.4 1.2 3.9 0.3 -0.8 -1.3 0.5 -0.2 -1.4 -0.3 -0.1
Ukraine 0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -2.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3
United Kingdom 0.7 0.8 0.7 2.6 -0.3 2.8 1.9 3.0 -0.9 0.4 -0.1 -1.0 -0.5
Uruguay 0.6 1.5 -0.2 1.8 5.3 5.9 0.6 -3.2 -3.6 1.4 -3.1 0.3 0.2
Venezuela 3.5 0.7 -0.5 -0.2 -0.8 -0.2 -2.2 -0.5 1.9 0.8 -1.5 -1.7 -0.3
Zambia 1.3 2.3 1.6 1.1 2.6 8.4 1.2 1.8 0.2 6.4 -1.3 -1.1 -3.2
(1) Real credit series were constructed using nominal bank credit (line 22d of the IFS) and CPI inflation (line 64 of the IFS) as deflator.
(2) The selected countries in the sample meet two requirements: (i) data must be available from at least January 2004 until May 2009; 
(ii) excludes outliers, countries with average credit growth rate for the complete sample period outside a 95% confidence interval 
of +/- two standard deviations from the sample's average.
(3) Euro area countries data includes, in addition to bank credit to the private sector, the bank credit to State and Local Government and bank credit 
to Public Nonfinancial Corporations (line 22s of the IFS).    
(4) Monthly growth rates averages from July 2005 to June 2007.
(5) Monthly growth rates averages from July 2007 to September 2008.
(6) Monthly growth rates averages from October 2008 to May 2009.
(7) Data includes real bank credit to both domestic and foreign clients.
Source: Author's own elaboration based on data from the IFS.  
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Real credit growth post LB bankruptcy (oct.08 - may.09) -0.39 0.76 -2.88 1.54
Real credit growth pre LB bankruptcy (sep.06-aug.08) 0.09 0.32 -0.78 1.26
Real GDP growth (Q4.08 - Q1.09) -3.98 4.23 -14.90 1.40
Trading partners' GDP growth (Q4.08 - Q1.09) -2.55 1.06 -6.20 -0.26
% Change in terms of trade (Q4.08) 0.98 13.6 -16.0 72.2
% Change in money market rate (sep.08 - may.09) -30 80 -97 497
Credit over GDP (2007) 60 48 2 253
Nominal GDP level (2007) 438 1,466 1 14,078
GDP per capita (2007) 13,180 18,058 125 103,591
Real GDP growth (2007) 5.50 3.33 -6.60 20.3
Real GDP growth - deviation from trend (2007) 1.79 2.43 -2.40 16.3
Financial integration index (2007) 0.72 1.59 -1.81 2.54
Trade openness (2007)  104 67 26 433
External debt (% of GDP, 2007) 43 35 3 221
Current account balance (% of GDP, 2007) -2.7 10.4 -25.2 25.7
Bank domestic liabilities dollarization (2004) 0.21 0.41 0.00 3.08
Share of public ownership of the banking system (2002) 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.86
Share of foreign ownership of the banking system (2002) 0.34 0.28 0.00 0.96
Bank leverage (2007) 12.8 5.22 4.40 30.3
Bank return on equity (2007) 19.0 8.34 4.7 47.7
Bank return on assets (2007)  1.73 0.92 0.10 3.90
Bank concentration (2007) 0.69 0.20 0.16 1.00
Bank dependence on wholesale funding  0.44 0.13 0.19 0.65
Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (2007)  14.6 4.08 10.0 30.1
Bank nonperforming loans to total loans (2007)  3.9 4.11 0.2 19.3
Bank provisions to nonperforming loans (2007)  97.1 51.35 25.7 214.6
Exchange rate regime (2005) 1.902 0.976 1 3
  21Table 3: Baseline Regressions  
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Dependent variable: Real credit growth post Lehman Bros. bankruptcy (deviation from trend, monthly average oct.08-may.09, seasonally ajusted rates) (a) (b)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Credit boom and bust
Real credit growth          -1.8587*** -2.4440*** -1.9566*** -1.8176*** -2.0104*** -1.6334*** -1.6459*** -2.1739*** -2.2477*** -2.2243*** -2.4184*** -2.1139*** -1.6192*** -2.1200*** -1.8382*** -1.8365*** -1.8118***
(sep.06-aug.08) (c) (0.2801) (0.6485) (0.4284) (0.2731) (0.2718) (0.2546) (0.2818) (0.3490) (0.3461) (0.3251) (0.3715) (0.3081) (0.3286) (0.3702) (0.3009) (0.3010) (0.3008)
Demand shock controls
GDP growth  (c) 0.0379***
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.0131)
Percentage change in terms of trade 0.0249**
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.0114)
Trading partners' GDP growth 0.0992** 0.0792* 0.1002** 0.0974* 0.0595 0.0493 0.0191 -0.0454 0.0747 0.0724 0.032 0.0881* 0.0870* 0.0926
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.0433) (0.0463) (0.0440) (0.0490) (0.0479) (0.0469) (0.0531) (0.0871) (0.0538) (0.0982) (0.1085) (0.0455) (0.0461) (0.0684)
Structural variables









Return on equity 0.0025
(2007) (0.0092)
Monetary policy
Percentage change in money market rate -0.0014*** -0.0039**
(sep.08-may.09) (0.0004) (0.0017)
Basis points change in money market rate 0.0568* 0.0638
(sep.08-may.09) (0.0318) (0.0565)
Basis points change in money market rate, -0.0907*** -0.1354**
for countries with a money market rate below 10% in sep.08 (0.0313) (0.0575)
(sep.08-may.09)
Exchange rate regime -0.0039 -0.1347*
(2005) (0.0559) (0.0727)
Country dummies (d)
OECD -0.1091 -0.0694 -0.079
(0.1951) (0.1613) (0.1701)
OECD with banks receiving public capital support -0.1174
(0.1919)
OECD with banks not receiving public capital support 0.0094
(0.2112)








Constant -0.2266*** 0.0346 -0.3198*** 0.0314 -0.1055 0.1039 -0.4701 -0.0792 -0.1516 -0.2218 -0.4546* -0.0098 -0.1131 0.3071 0.0697 0.071 0.0976
(0.0676) (0.0976) (0.0790) (0.1373) (0.1859) (0.1512) (0.3583) (0.2601) (0.2071) (0.1615) (0.2613) (0.1771) (0.2500) (0.3039) (0.1557) (0.1566) (0.1880)
Observations 83 37 35 82 67 79 73 59 60 47 47 46 35 57 82 82 82
R^2 0.45 0.54 0.61 0.47 0.61 0.49 0.47 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.52 0.68 0.63 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.51
Ajusted R^2 0.44 0.52 0.58 0.46 0.59 0.47 0.45 0.55 0.56 0.60 0.48 0.65 0.57 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.47
(a) ***Statistical significance at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. (b) Standard errors in parenthesis. (c) Deviation from trend.
(d) OECD: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom. 
EMBI: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Poland, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine,  
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Latin America: Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,  Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Emeging Europe: Bulgaria, Croacia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Emerging Asia: Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Thailand.  Table 4: Instrumental variable regressions for explanatory variable: Percentage change 
in money market rate (sep.08-may.09) 
 
First-stage regressions
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 47
Model 91584.086 3 30528.03 F(  3,    43) = 4.180
Residual 313899.881 43 7299.997 Prob > F = 0.011
Total 405483.967 46 8814.869 R-squared = 0.2259
Adj R-squared = 0.1719
Root MSE = 85.44
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Real credit growth                        -83.379 55.539 -1.50 0.141 -195.4 28.63
(sep.06-aug.08) (a)
Trading partners' GDP growth -17.733 11.125 -1.59 0.118 -40.17 4.703
(Q4.08-Q1.09)
YoY inflation rate 5.5700 2.2913 2.43 0.019 0.949 10.19
(jun-aug.08)
Constant -123.08 34.045 -3.62 0.001 -191.74 -54.43
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression Number of obs = 47
F(  3,     43) = 17.73
Prob > F = 0.000
R-squared = 0.5153
Root MSE = 0.480
Coef. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Percentage change in money  -0.0039 0.0017 -2.28 0.028 -0.007 0.000
market rate (sep.08-may.09)
Real credit growth                        -2.4184 0.3715 -6.51 0.000 -3.167 -1.669
(sep.06-aug.08) (a)
Trading partners' GDP growth -0.0454 0.0871 -0.52 0.605 -0.221 0.130
(Q4.08-Q1.09)
Constant -0.4546 0.2613 -1.74 0.089 -0.982 0.072
Instrumented: Percentage change in money market rate (sep.08-may.09)
Instruments: Real credit growth (sep.06-aug.08) (a), Trading partners' GDP growth (Q4.08-Q1.09), YoY inflation rate (jun-aug.08)
(a) Deviation from trend.
Percentage change in money market rate 
(sep.08-may.09)
Real credit growth                          (oct.08-
may.09) (a)






















  23Table 5: Interactions with regions  
  
Dependent variable: Real credit growth post Lehman Bros. bankruptcy (deviation from trend, monthly average oct.08-may.09, 
seasonally ajusted rates) (a) (b)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real credit growth * OECD                           -4.0138*** -4.0160***
(sep.06-aug.08) (c) (1.1188) (1.1233)
Real credit growth * Developing countries                    -1.5710*** -1.4666***
(sep.06-aug.08) (c) (0.2914) (0.2907)
Real credit growth * EMBI                       -1.6672***
(sep.06-aug.08) (c) (0.4283)
Real credit growth * Latin America                     -0.601
(sep.06-aug.08) (c) (1.2659)
Real credit growth * Emerging Europe                -1.0350*
(sep.06-aug.08) (c) (0.5321)
Real credit growth * Emerging Asia              -1.9867**
(sep.06-aug.08) (c) (0.8634)
Trading partners' GDP growth * OECD -0.0509 -0.0532
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.1927) (0.1947)
Trading partners' GDP growth * Developing countries 0.0687 0.0145
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.0838) (0.0442)
Trading partners' GDP growth * EMBI 0.0648
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.0714)
Trading partners' GDP growth * Latin America -0.0887
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.2318)
Trading partners' GDP growth * Emerging Europe -0.0511
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.0766)
Trading partners' GDP growth * Emerging Asia -0.4668***
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.1432)
Percentage change in money market rate * OECD -0.0273*
(sep.08-may.09) (0.0143)
Percentage change in money market rate * Developing countries -0.0002
(sep.08-may.09) (0.0054)
Percentage change in money market rate * EMBI -0.0023
(sep.08-may.09) (0.0020)
Real credit growth                        -1.8307*** -1.8298*** -1.9543**
(sep.06-aug.08) (c) (0.3057) (0.3172) (0.7765)
Trading partners' GDP growth 0.071 0.115 -0.0044
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.0722) (0.0746) (0.1527)
OECD -0.024 -0.0137 -0.3575 -0.2436 -1.8742*
(0.1556) (0.1471) (0.4934) (0.5082) (0.9582)
Latin America -0.2320 -0.2814 -0.2001 -0.3911 -0.1609
(0.1575) (0.1727) (0.1596) (0.5413) (0.2236)
Emerging Europe -0.298 -0.1431 -0.1923 -0.5673 -0.292
(0.2843) (0.3136) (0.2676) (0.3977) (0.3698)
Emerging Asia 0.4677** 0.5426** 0.4823** -1.0917** 0.3349
(0.1991) (0.2666) (0.1876) (0.4927) (0.2432)
Constant 0.0405 0.1318 0.027 -0.0957 -0.2101
(0.1958) (0.2002) (0.1848) (0.1269) (0.4167)
Observations 82 82 82 82 47
R^2 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.65
Ajusted R^2 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.56
(a) ***Statistical significance at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. 
(b) Standard errors in parenthesis.













  24Table 6: Other interactions 
  
Dependent variable: Real credit growth post Lehman Bros. bankruptcy (deviation from trend, monthly average 
oct.08-may.09, seasonally ajusted rates) (a) (b) (c)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Real credit growth * High real credit growth          -1.8556***
(sep.06-aug.08) (d) (0.2735)
Real credit growth * Low real credit growth          -1.8220**
(sep.06-aug.08) (d) (0.8104)
Trading partners' GDP growth * High trading partners' GDP growth -0.1207
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.1111)
Trading partners' GDP growth * Low trading partners' GDP growth 0.0351
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.0293)
High credit over GDP 0.2056*
(2007) (0.1074)
Low credit over GDP 0.3252*
(2007) (0.1653)
High financial integration 0.0152
(2007) (0.1152)










High return on equity -0.074
(2007) (0.1744)
High return on equity -0.0008
(2007) (0.1222)
Real credit growth          -1.8044*** -1.7974*** -1.6999*** -1.7442*** -1.7601*** -1.8036***
(sep.06-aug.08) (d) (0.2674) (0.2592) (0.2664) (0.2685) (0.2995) (0.2845)
Trading partners' GDP growth 0.1100** 0.0846* 0.0775* 0.0924** 0.0927** 0.0952**
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.0449) (0.0451) (0.0431) (0.0435) (0.0436) (0.0454)
Constant -0.0043 -0.2312*** -0.0977 -0.1195 0.0318 0.0532 0.0342
(0.1505) (0.0871) (0.1586) (0.1503) (0.1311) (0.1462) (0.1400)
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
R^2 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.47
Ajusted R^2 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.45
(a) ***Statistical significance at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. 
(b) Standard errors in parenthesis.
(c) "High" refers to the observations above the 75% percentile, and "Low" to the observations below the 25% percentile.

















  25Table 7: Sensitivity analysis 
 
Dependent variable: Real credit growth (deviation from trend, monthly average, seasonally ajusted rates) (a) (b)


















Real credit growth          -0.5818***
(sep.07-aug.08) (c) (0.1539)
Real credit growth          -1.8176***
(sep.06-aug.08) (c) (0.2731)
Real credit growth          -2.3357***
(sep.05-aug.08) (c) (0.5698)
Real credit growth          -3.2952***
(sep.04-aug.08) (c) (0.9200)
Real credit growth          -3.5624***
(sep.03-aug.08) (c) (0.8148)
Real credit growth - different trend (d)      -0.5758*
(sep.06-aug.08) (c) (0.3390)
Real credit growth          -0.8998***
(aug.05-jul.07) (c) (0.2068)
Real credit growth          -0.7709***
(mar.04-feb.06) (c) (0.1959)
Trading partners' GDP growth 0.1613*** 0.0992** 0.1001** 0.0907 0.1512** 0.1733** -0.0275 -0.0159
(Q4.08-Q1.09) (0.0601) (0.0433) (0.0483) (0.0559) (0.0608) (0.0823) (0.0551) (0.0540)
Constant 0.005 0.0314 0.112 0.0488 0.1387 -0.075 0.1137 -0.0104
(0.1976) (0.1373) (0.1568) (0.1831) (0.1919) (0.2624) (0.1603) (0.1587)
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 82 109 109
R ^ 2 0 . 2 40 . 4 70 . 3 20 . 2 70 . 2 90 . 0 80 . 2 30 .
A j u s t e d  R ^ 2 0 . 2 30 . 4 60 . 3 10 . 2 50 . 2 70 . 0 60 . 2 10 .
(a) ***Statistical significance at 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. 
(b) Standard errors in parenthesis.
(c) Deviation from trend.
(d) The trend is calculated using HP filters and data from January 2002 until August 2008. For the other variables of this table 
the data used to calculate the trend was from January 2002 until the last available month.
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